The Syrian Revolution is a huge opportunity for Türkiye

For now, the Syrian Revolution is undoubtedly a victory for Turkey, but there are obvious ways to still waste advantages.

When Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the top leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, ominously suggested on December 11 that an unnamed “neighbor in Syria” played a role in the decline of the Bashar Assad regime, it was obvious to everyone he said.

Currently, the biggest winner in the region seems to be Türkiye. Remember the Arab Spring? It may feel like a distant memory, but in many ways, its impact has recently surfaced. What’s going on in Syria is almost exactly what Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hopes to unfold in 2011.

In the following years, he had to wait and see and endured a great deal of humiliation. His bet on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood caused a catastrophic mistake. Türkiye may support the wrong side of Libya, and this remains an unstable and messy deadlock. In the Syrian civil war following the early democratic protests, Türkiye took on the burden of hosting millions of Syrian refugees, more than any other country.

Since then, Türkiye has long had to reduce its ambitions in the region. Although the Mohammed bin Salman regime killed Istanbul in Istanbul in Istanbul (Istanbul) by the Mohammed bin Salman regime, it made friendly proposals not only to the Sisi regime in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

In the final humiliation, Ankara even began to accept that it had to be friendly with Assad again, despite their efforts to expel him. Pressure to support Assad is again due to the need to repatriate Syrian refugees, which have caused election problems in Türkiye.

Türkiye’s victory

Türkiye can claim great honor for the Syrian incident through some defenses. It was their deal with Russia that allowed Idlib, the last desperate hip of Syrian rebel territory, to remain unconquered. Apparently, without Turkey, their troops have been stationed in Idlib since 2017 to “relegate” the troops, and Assad and the Russians probably ended the rebellion a few years ago.

It is unclear to what extent the Russian leader decided to deviate Assad from the balance slightly from the balance for strategic reasons. This policy makes Assad more dependent on Russia by deliberately ceding Syrian territory, which remains beyond Assad’s control.

If Russia does try to deceive Assad, it will backfire. But, like everything in the Syrian conflict, it is not as simple as “Türkiye takes everything away.” In fact, Türkiye’s influence on Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – leading the lightning strike on Aleppo and turning into a stampede on Damascus is limited.

Türkiye-backed rebels have established presence in two pockets of two territories north of Aleppo. Although these groups played a major role in the conflict in Syria, their main focus was to combat the Kurdish-led militia, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which gained our support and helped Salafist’s self-proclaimed Caliphate Islamic state expel Salavs from northern Syria.

For President Erdogan, this situation may be a dream come true, but it may also not be able to pass Türkiye’s way. Türkiye is the main obstacle to the ambition of an international actor who wants a new Syrian government that truly contains all Syrians.

Türkiye’s Kurdish issue

A major ethnic group in Syria is an important ethnic minority of the Kurds, concentrated in the northern border area next to Türkiye and Iraq. Their political leaders are dominated by parties associated with the Workers’ Kurdish Party (PKK), which has been in conflict with the Turkish state since the 1980s.

The People’s Protection Force (YPG) is the Kurdish militia that forms the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and controls Al-Hasaka, a land triangle sandwiched between Turkey and Iraq in the far northeast. They also control strips of the northern border with Turkey, including the border town of Kobani, which the infamous Kurds led a successful attack to recapture it from the Islamic State after the U.S.-backed Kurds.

Despite not actively supporting the ISIS, Türkiye seems to prefer it to the Kurdish militia in the region. Türkiye often describes these groups as “terrorists” because their ties to the PKK are designated as terrorist organizations by many international organizations.

Many believe that Türkiye’s Ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) originated from political Islam and is more satisfied with Islamic jihadists than the Syrian Kurdish or the Alawian regime of the Assad family.

Now, after the war, this preference is also evident, as HTS (Al-Qaeda’s Roots) leads the siege of Aleppo. Many suspect HTS has received some support from Ankara. Obviously, Turkey’s success will be a new Syrian government dominated by Sunni Muslims who favor moderate Islamism. Ideally, Türkiye would maintain good relations with external players while calling on the new Syrian government to impose rule on the Kurds in northern Syria. It is also ideal for Turkey if Syria’s leaders suppress the SDF, which is currently the de facto authority in much of the northern region.

Troubles in Syria

Türkiye’s vision for Syria is unrealistic and will likely lead to many political parties being left out of the table in the future. If Ankara promotes and encourages Syrian actors aimed at suppressing Kurdish power and representation, it has the potential to undermine the country’s pursuit of democracy. This could lead to a new regime suppressing non-Arab in the same way as the Assad regime. The Syrian Arab Republic regards racial exclusivity as a fundamental aspect of its society. This exclusion is also the root of the thorny problems of Türkiye and Kurdish minorities.

Until the Middle Eastern countries begin to transcend narrow nationalism and recognize the multiracial nature of their politics, we are likely to see persistent repression and instability. In this grim future, each state will avoid the weaknesses of its neighbors to gain influence and leverage in its affairs.

((Joey T. McFadden Edited this. )

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of fair observers.